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Abstract—The motivation for corporate leadership to engage
with cyber risks is increasingly clear. Stories can be seen
of cyber incidents which have crippled large-scale businesses,
potentially for extended periods of time and at significant cost.
Our contribution here explores a much under-researched area —
perceptions of cybersecurity and cyber risk at the highest levels
of an organisation — with the aim of developing a structured,
scenario-driven and repeatable exercise for executive decision-
makers. We attempt to understand why cyber risk perception is
an important concept but equally a challenging one to grasp. We
address this by demonstrating an approach to risk articulation, in
terms of systematically constructed scenarios, and assess whether
this resonates with decision-makers. As part of this, we also
attempt to assess cyber-risk decision-makers for their perception
of wider business risks and stakeholders.
Keywords—Security management, Decision making, Business
continuity, Risk analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber attacks pose an existential risk to organisations the
world over, as acknowledged by the World Economic Forum’s
Global Risks Report 2020 [1], sitting just below climate
change. The past few decades of enterprise digitisation and
automation has led to cybersecurity playing a central role to
an organisation’s status and resilience. As such, this places
it firmly within the responsibility of organisational senior
leadership [2] in terms of risk management and ownership.
The significant risk posed by cyber attacks has shown to
cripple large businesses and their customer bases, for extended
periods of time and at significant cost. Examples include the
malware incident at Maersk [3] and the ransomware attack
on Norsk Hydro [4]. Other recent examples have shut down
major hospitals’ systems. In 2017, the WannaCry cyber attack
resulted in widespread impacts to the UK National Health
Service [5]. In June 2020, destabilising and malicious cyber
activities were directed against those whose work is critical
to the response against the Covid-19 pandemic, including
healthcare services, hospitals and research institutes [6].
This paper is concerned with establishing clarity on how
executive decision-makers support wider business to respond
to cyber attacks. Such incidents are often complex and riddled
with uncertainty. What is clear is that managing business risks
that arise from cyber attacks demands informed decisions to
be made and the executive leadership must be prepared.
This work represents an exploratory study in an under-
researched area — perceptions of cybersecurity and cyber risk
at the highest levels of an organisation — to develop a struc-
tured, scenario-driven and repeatable exercise for executive
decision-makers. This effort aims to assess how cybersecurity
and cyber risk are perceived at the top level in organisa-
tions. This would ensure alignment of cyber risk manage-
ment decisions (amidst rapid developments in the technologies
of networked, IT-supported business infrastructures) with the
view from organisation leadership and, by extension, executive
decision-makers. As such, this paper sets out to address the
following research questions:
• RQ1: Does an approach to risk articulation, which is
driven by systematically constructed scenarios, effec-
tively capture insights from decision-makers?
• RQ2: Do cyber-risk decision-makers perceive whether
wider business risks and stakeholders relate to their
domain of decisions?
We take inspiration from war games and strategy exercises,
which have evolved into a range of useful tools used for mil-
itary planning, disaster management, emergency preparedness
and national resilience. Planning for business risk mitigation
arising out of cyber attacks could benefit from instincts and
insights drawn from the decision-making process of partic-
ipants, including risk perception and ownership. The cyber
attack scenarios are key here as acknowledged by Haggman [7]
who draws out their value for preparing analytical skills in the
cybersecurity context:
“The further we seek to gaze into the future, the
more we have to employ our imaginative rather
than our analytical faculties because of the increased
uncertainty. [...] futures imagined on a shorter time
frame can often be realistic.”
Pushing on the plausibility of the scenarios (including
escalations of cyber-related risks) could be a useful dimension
to articulate various challenges around mitigating risks from
cyber attacks including stakeholder management, ownership,
uncertainty and complexity. There is a trade-off to be had in
scenarios that could be realistic on the one hand, and if pushed
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to be more ahead of the times, could actually serve to prepare
for unchartered territory.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Background
to the research and related work are discussed in Section
II; the methodology and exercise design explained in Section
III; and results presented in Section IV. Closing remarks and
consideration of future work are found in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Executive Decision-makers
Where cybersecurity research has investigated high-level
decisions about how the security of organisations and systems
are managed, it has mainly focused at the level of security
managers [8] and not reached the level of executive decision-
makers interacting with other functions at the highest level of
an organisation. As computer technology and networked sys-
tems increasingly become part of normal business operations
[9], there are calls for the role of IT (and in turn, cybersecurity)
to be recognised as a top-level, board responsibility, given
it’s nature and that it “will impact all aspects of a business
including strategy, business development, supply chain, staff
and customer experience” [10].
Thus, executive decision-makers of such organisations are
the target of this study. In referencing decision-makers, we
acknowledge that this can involve a large group of individuals,
as a ‘board’, and potentially external, ‘non-executive’ directors
(who may be part-time) [11]. We consider ‘executives’ to be
those who must make decisions which drive the direction and
strategy of an organisation. Also, “all organisations are differ-
ent and each board needs to set its own direction and tone for
cyber security.” [10]. This includes various governance models
which incorporate different types of decision making, e.g., a
classic “hierarchical organisation” or a “matrix organisation”
reporting to many others.
While executive boards take many forms, this paper focuses
on governance-related decisions which involve multiple exec-
utive decision-makers of an organisation. Also, we consider
that executive decision-makers have a need to address multiple
directives at once, e.g., that the organisation is secure while
also being able to operate in its primary capacity. This is
especially true when breaches and cyber attacks come to public
attention – health trusts shutting off their internet connections
and working with pen-and-paper during the WannaCry cyber
attack [5] is one example of such a decision.
B. Cyber Risk Perception
Organisational leadership faces all kinds of risks, many of
which are distinct from the risks those in other roles must con-
sider to reach informed decisions. Top-level decision-making
involves complex interactions between leadership teams [11],
around ‘episodic’ decisions and strategic issues. Senior leaders
may receive new information from sources including news
articles and peers, and delegate the evaluation of tools and
technologies to security managers [8]. Risk perception is
relevant for organisational leadership because it influences
their decision-making. Understanding cyber risk perception –
and its challenges – allows for insights into strategic and guid-
ing decisions taken around cybersecurity and cyber incident
response. This is the first step in designing a capacity building
exercise for decision-makers who work at the interface of
senior security management and the executive leadership.
This is not to say that to be able to assess risk correctly,
an organisation must first experience an attack, or a simulated
attack. There can be testing or ‘drills’ of security-related
continuity plans. However, since organisations must respond to
cyber emergencies or crises we consider learning for crisis, and
developing preparedness, through simulations. Simulations not
only test preparedness, but can also “provide decision makers
with experiential learning” [12].
Errors in judgement by decision-makers, often due to
incorrect risk perception, lead to a disproportionate response,
which can cause mistakes in resource allocation or incident
escalation. The design of scenario-based methods to test and
challenge cybersecurity decision-making skills [13] typically
factors in four elements: overall objectives, scenario injects,
observation methods, and evaluation methods. As such, these
are an instrument for decision-makers to learn how to act
amidst uncertainty in unfamiliar and complex situations, and
develop the strategic “muscle memory to effectively react”
[13].
C. Related Work
The OCTAVE Allegro risk management method includes
threat scenario identification [14], to support examination of
threats to specific known assets. Threat scenarios may then
expand the risk identification process across dimensions that
threats outside of the organization’s control, such as ‘interde-
pendency risks.’ We capture interdependent risks using a risk
taxonomy and connections to other roles in the organisation
and wider ecosystem, with a view to coordinating response
and clarifying the role of cybersecurity in addressing risks.
Rhee et al. [15] specifically explore whether top-level
managers exhibit an optimistic bias toward their perception
of the security risks which relate to their organisation. This
is examined through comparison of executives’ responses to
a closed-question survey, comparing the risks and extent of
control that relate to their organisation, to those perceived
for business partners and comparable companies. The authors
found an appreciation for the interdependence between organ-
isations, where here we explore the relationship between such
interdependence to state level, and the types of risk which may
prompt risk response activities.
Shreeve et al. [16] studied the decision-making of partici-
pants in a tabletop cyber-physical game. The authors identified
four structural patterns and two reasoning strategies to risk
decision-making (risk-first and opportunity-first). The authors
found that their participants were driven less by risk-first
approaches which identify an optimal response (as advocated
in standards such as NIST-800-53), and more by the responses
that a team is capable of enacting within its existing capabili-
ties and how successful those would be. Here we explore the
perceived role of different risk classes and actors in achieving
acceptable security outcomes to emerging organisational risks.
The Kaspersky Interactive Protection Simulation (KIPS)
[17] is a commercial service targeted at increasing awareness
of cyber-related risks at higher levels of management (specif-
ically managers of business systems and IT). The offering is
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driven by a view that top-level managers in organisations differ
in their perspective on cybersecurity risks. Scenario variations
focus on training about identified threats to specific sectors,
with a focus on how IT security can be managed in a way
that does not hamper production facilities. Here we focus
on eliciting perspectives on related threats and challenges in
coordinating an appropriate strategic response to cyber-related
risks across cooperating stakeholders.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section we describe the design of our scenario
exercise and study protocol, informed by the understanding of
executive security decision-makers as in the previous section.
Executive decision-makers respond more naturally to a
descriptive perspective on risk (as opposed to a normative
description, e.g., costs and probabilities) [18, p. 14]. This
has been seen elsewhere as also applying within the security
domain [19]. For these reasons we expose participants to
systematically constructed scenarios which describe events
applicable to their level of decision-making (Section III-A).
Risk decisions at this level involve dimensions such as “uncer-
tainty, ignorance, incomplete knowledge, and ambiguity” [18],
where these serve as parameters in the design of the scenarios
(Section III-B). The scenarios are designed to encapsulate
a complete description of the process of risk taking, which
together with participant responses will provide the full view
of risk consideration at the executive level, as highlighted by
Shapira [18, p. 21]:
• Definition of risk, for a specific situation.
• Attitudes toward risk: capture tendencies and values.
• Dealing with risk: evaluation, choice, and post-
decision behavior.
We address the definition of risk in our scenario design
(Section III-A), toward eliciting anticipated responses and
choices (Section III-B). A survey (see Appendix) captures
these elements, and a debrief after the survey offers partici-
pants the opportunity to explain their reasoning.
A. Scenario design for executive cyber-risks
One challenge to designing engaging scenarios is maintain-
ing ecological validity [20]. Although participants will know
the scenario is not real, efforts can be made to ensure that
the scenario is close enough to reality, that participants can
consider the scenario as if they were in a real-life situation
that the exercise emulates.
We designed a series of scenarios which, when explored in
sequence, explore escalation of complexity and ambiguity in
a cyber incident for a hypothetical “Company A”, as in Table
I. Incidents are presented across multiple rounds in the same
exercise to reflect escalating risk levels (low, medium, high).
The content of the scenarios is informed by the authors’
knowledge of IT systems and processes which real organi-
sations are likely to have in place, and threats which can
affect those elements of organisation infrastructure. Known
security incidents in recent history informed the design in
terms of signalling what may be possible, in effect acting like
Haggman’s possible near-future cybersecurity event [7].
Scenario design was informed by known cybersecurity in-
cidents which have affected a business. A similar approach has
been used elsewhere to study security analysts [21]. Here, we
draw on notable events such as the Norsk Hydro ransomware
attack [4] (Scenario 1), the Blackbaud system compromise of
2020 which had potential ramifications for many organisations
[22] (Scenario 2), and the WannaCry [5] and NotPetya /
Maersk [3] attacks (Scenario 3). We manage the elements of
a scenario as escalations across specific dimensions according
to the risk level associated with the scenario, as in Section
III-B. Scenario content loosely follows a structure of incident,
response activity, and executive–level imperatives.
The scenarios capture escalation of attack severity through
a series of distinct cyber incidents. The benefit of playing
through each scenario is exposure to incidents with varying
degrees of impact. In terms of impact from cyber risk, this
represents an escalation from low to medium to high (Table
I). The severity of the cyber risk is primarily represented as
the severity of an attack and criticality of the affected system,
but as in Table II can escalate by including a more complex
mix of affected people and systems. As the scenario escalates,
the level of technical complexity and uncertainty then also
grows. To note, the latter is not the omission of detail, but the
inclusion of factors in a scenario which a security executive is
not expected to have immediate knowledge of.
B. Scenario dimensions
Executive risk decision-making is potentially a process
that calls on judgement, control, and skills [18]. We then
design our scenarios across clear dimensions, along which
an executive participant may draw on judgement calls, as
a professional involved in a management decision-making
process and weighing up factors. This is as opposed to ‘calling
the odds’ as in gambling.
Table II illustrates the dimensions which are used to
construct the ‘recipe’ for each of the scenarios we presented
to executive cyber-risk managers: Risk externalities; Stake-
holder management; Anticipated risks; Areas of uncertainty;
Technical areas of complexity, and; Attack classification. Each
column in Table II, ‘Low’ to ‘High’, describes responses
that the authors anticipate for each scenario. In this sense,
the exercise is as much about evaluating the scenario design
approach as it is evaluating risk perceptions of participants.
1) Anticipated risks: We assess the scenarios for business
risks, as per the Cambridge Taxonomy of Business Risks [23],
which outlines business risks that could be explicitly modelled:
- Financial risks, such as economic outlook and vari-
ables, market crisis, trading environments, business
and competition;
- Geopolitical risks, such as national security, corrup-
tion & crime, government business policy, change in
government, political violence, and interstate conflict;
- Environmental risks, such as extreme weather, geo-
physical, space, climate change, environmental degra-
dation, natural resource deficiency and food security;
- Social risks, such as socioeconomic trends, human
capital, brand perception, sustainable living, health
and disease;
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- Governance risks, such as non-compliance, litiga-
tion, strategic performance, management performance,
business model deficiencies, pension management and
products & services.
2) Attack classification: We used a real-world scale for
cyber attack categorisation as inspiration, specifically, the
scale proposed by the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre
(NCSC) [24]. The risk impact guides our scenario writing in
terms of distinguishing across the severity of the scenarios. The
six-category scale characterises cyber attacks, from localised
incidents affecting individuals or small businesses, escalating
up to a national emergency with major consequences. The
latter can include possible loss of life. The following scale
was shared with participants before they saw the scenarios:
- Category 1 (National cyber emergency). Causes sus-
tained disruption of essential services or affects na-
tional security, leading to severe economic or social
consequences or to loss of life;
- Category 2 (Highly significant incident). Has a serious
impact on central government, essential services, a
large proportion of the population, or the economy;
- Category 3 (Significant incident). Has a serious impact
on a large organisation or on wider / local government,
or which poses a considerable risk to central govern-
ment or essential services;
- Category 4 (Substantial incident). Has a serious im-
pact on a medium-sized organisation, or which poses
a considerable risk to a large organisation or wider /
local government;
- Category 5 (Moderate incident). Poses considerable
risk to a small or medium-sized organisation, or pre-
liminary indications of cyber activity against a large
organisation or the government;
- Category 6 (Localised incident). Poses considerable
risk to an individual, or preliminary indications
of cyber activity against a small or medium-sized
organisation.
3) Complexity and uncertainty: We include questions for
each scenario, where we ask participants to identify areas
of complexity and uncertainty. As a simple measure of the
response to the design regarding stakeholders (as in Table
II), we ask participants to indicate the perceived scope of
responsibility for the incident on a scale from private sector to
state-owned.
Table II presents our characterisation of scenarios across di-
mensions of risk impact, the level of stakeholder management
needed, anticipated risks, and areas of uncertainty and tech-
nical complexity. The characteristics in Table I are distinctly
encapsulated in the narrative of the associated scenario. These
characteristics become different dimensions over which cyber-
risk escalation is expressed. These are self-assessed based on
the authors’ observations, experience, and analysis of related
publicised incidents.
To summarise, the risk externalities (those affected by
decisions relating to the risk) [25], stakeholders and anticipated
risks are elements directly designed into each scenario. Uncer-
tainty and complexity are introduced in a more subtle fashion.
Attack classification is self-assessed based on the author team’s
interpretation of the NCSC attack categories [24].
C. Study protocol
Each of the three scenario rounds was forty minutes long
in duration, to allow participants to read the scenario, ask
for clarifications, complete the survey form, and to allow for
occasional breaks. For each scenario, the participant group is
presented with a summary of the incident designed to evoke a
response (as in Table I).
After reading each scenario summary, the participants were
asked to rate the impact (‘attack classification’, Section III-B)
and to select and rank the business-related risks which they
perceive as being present, using a response sheet (see the
Appendix for details of these questions). At the end of the
exercise, time was allowed for a group debrief and discussion.
In terms of risk ownership and the responsibility to mitigate
risk, participants were also asked to position the split of
responsibility between state and private sectors on a Likert
scale – at either end of a 6-point scale were state responsibility
(1) and private sector (5), with the mid-point representing
equally-shared responsibility. In closing each scenario-specific
round, participants were also asked to note any areas of
uncertainty and particular technical complexity they felt were
present in each scenario (where these were free-text questions).
D. Ethics
The study was approved as part of institutional human-
facing research review. This includes satisfying ethical obli-
gations ensuring participatory consent, due governance of
data collection (including storage, processing, sharing and
deletion in compliance with GDPR), digital needs met through
secure infrastructure, and following distancing protocols due
to COVID-19.
We also addressed the principles of the Menlo Report [26]
for ethical research in ICT. This includes question design that
did not require sensitive business details to be revealed, and
an environment which encouraged participation, while also
recognising the busy schedules of participants and the time
they contributed to the activity; for instance, we designed data
collection and questions to facilitate short answers.
We intended to recruit participants who are highly–
experienced, who are then also rare to find and recruit.
Difficulty in recruiting security managers at this level has
been noted elsewhere, due to their high workload and ‘poor
reachability’ [27]. Participation was voluntary, with partici-
pants provided a high-level executive summary of results and
reflections. We also ensured no hindrance of fair representation
of diversity (in terms of age, disability, race, gender, religion,
sexual identity) amongst the participants.
E. Participants
The participants were recruited through a national science
academy in a European country. Participants were chief infor-
mation officers and IT managers, all with some responsibil-
ity of decision-making for cyber security in their respective
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TABLE I. EXERCISE SCENARIOS. THESE ARE WRITTEN AS A NARRATIVE AROUND AN ORGANISATION REFERRED TO AS “COMPANY A”. WHILE
PRESENTED AS THREE SCENARIOS, THE PARTICIPANTS ARE OFFERED A CONTINUING NARRATIVE TO START WITH SCENARIO 1 WHICH THEN ESCALATES IN
TWO SUBSEQUENT ROUNDS THROUGH SCENARIO 2 AND SCENARIO 3, AS A SERIES OF DEVELOPMENTS.
Scenario 1
The IT Team at Company A has reported a possible ransomware attack on their enterprise server, resulting in the encryption of the company’s central data storage. This
has caused the company’s accounts and finance, and human resources teams to have no access at all to their data.
The IT team have shared a communication from alleged hackers asking for a ransom of US$10,000 within three days from the receipt of the email.
The hacking group has threatened to post out stored credit card details of the company’s customers on a public site, if the ransom is not paid. They have also threatened to
cause further damage to the company.
The legal team, who have the remit to assure Company A’s compliance with GDPR, have been asked to assess what liability is there to Company A.
The CEO has asked for an immediate investigation of the causes (including practices and behaviours) that may have led to this attack. Whether this attack has any other
impact is also to be investigated.
Scenario 2
The Estates Team at Company A has reported a malfunction with the digital building management system (BMS). The BMS is used to control the heating and ventilation
of the entire HQ of Company A. This is a new system that has been operational only for the past year, and is critical to the company complying with national guidelines on
managing the carbon footprint resulting from energy usage. The malfunction has caused the top floor of all the buildings in the HQ to be unsuitable for working, and staff
located on these floors have had to work remotely for the past week.
The IT Team has confirmed that the new BMS is connected to the corporate IT network. They have confidently denied any link with the recent ransomware attack. They
have asserted that the central data storage, which was the main target of the ransomware attack, has no link to the BMS system even if both are connected to the corporate
IT network.
The Estates Team have had the suppliers of the BMS investigate the malfunction. The BMS supplier has reported that they have not encountered such a malfunction before,
and are not ruling out an intentional malicious attempt for which Company A has to take responsibility. The suppliers have argued their technology is in use all over the
world for several years insisting their technology is reliable.
The above has raised tension between the IT and Estates Teams, as the possibility of this being linked to the recent ransomware attack has not gone away. The CEO has
asked for the health and well-being of the staff affected in the relevant areas to be prioritised, along with a wider investigation.
Scenario 3
The national media is reporting a nation-wide cyber attack on the country’s infrastructure, targeting commercial and residential housing, and even infrastructure (including
train stations and airport), around the country. The attack is affecting power supply to many of these buildings, directly affecting heating and ventilation systems, access
control, and elevators and escalators. Stations and airports have been put on high alert, with many journeys disrupted due to cancellations.
A few days before the national incident (above), the national cyber security agency had approached Company A with a view to conducting a forensic examination across
some of the computers, corporate network routers and PLCs interfacing the HQ building that was affected previously. The agency staff had confirmed that the impact of the
attack on Company A had been a source of further disruption across buildings in other cities; exact details on the resulting impact are not known however.
More details on the national cyber attack have been released by the media, which point to a vulnerability in the digital BMS system, supplied by the same supplier to
Company A. The vulnerability affects the back-end cloud service provided by the supplier to allow for remote updating of the PLCs.
Some of the reports have even pointed a finger to the attack that targeted Company A, calling it the source of the attack. The attack is being attributed to a neighbouring
country who has long been an aggressor to its neighbours. While none of this information has been confirmed by the authorities, this has raised concerns amongst the top
leadership of Company A.
The Board of Directors of Company A are now wanting more details from the IT and Estates Teams. Some of the Directors are wanting to issue a press release to assure
the wider public.
organisations. The background of the participants provided
a mix of public and private sector organisations. A few of
the participants also held advisory roles in government, with
responsibility for working closely with the private sector for
cyber resilience.
There were 19 participants, with experience of IT-related
decision making ranging from 1 to 10+ years. There was
one additional attendee who did not complete any of the
demographics or per-scenario surveys; they cannot be included
in the Results regarding structured questions, but had the
potential to contribute to the post-scenario discussion. For
simplicity based on their level of participation, we regard this
as not having happened.
Participants were asked to indicate their responsibilities in
a pre-workshop survey (see Appendix). Responsibilities are
diverse, spanning the procurement of new services and equip-
ment, to IT support and policy management. Three participants
did not respond to this question, including the attendee who
did not complete any surveys.
It was important to capture the nature of participants’
existing risk focus, which we also asked about using the
Cambridge Risk Taxonomy. This is represented in Figure 1,
illustrating a focus on Technology risks as relating strongly
to cybersecurity. This can be expected, although the perceived
importance differs, as indicated by the number of different
rankings/colours on this particular stacked bar. There is also
recognition here of Governance and Financial risks as being
strongly related to cybersecurity in organisations; participants
recognised the relevance of other risks (see Section III-B).
IV. RESULTS
Two of the authors facilitated the workshop with partici-
pants. Here we discuss participant responses to the scenarios in
initial subsections, as recorded in survey answers, and as also
derived from overview notes taken by the authors facilitating
the workshop (as in Section IV-E). We refer to Scenario 1,
Scenario 2, and Scenario 3 as S1, S2, and S3 respectively.
A. Pre-scenario risk ranking
We saw – as in Figure 1 – that all of the six categories
were ranked by the participant group, although where they
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TABLE II. SCENARIO DIMENSIONS. EACH DIMENSION, OR CHARACTERISATION, IS REPRESENTED IN EACH SCENARIO. THE CHARACTERISATIONS
REPRESENT A MIX OF ELEMENTS DESIGNED INTO EACH SCENARIO, AND ANTICIPATED RESPONSES WHICH WOULD BE WITHIN EXPECTATIONS WHEN
ENGAGING WITH PARTICIPANTS.
Characterisation Scenario 1 (Low) Scenario 2 (Medium) Scenario 3 (High)
Risk Externalities (in terms Who? Who? Who?
of who and what is directly Customers Company Staff Company Staff
and evidently affected Other Building Occupants Other Building Occupants
beyond the IT Team) What? Estates Team Estates Team
Customer Data Residents (across cities)
What? Commercial occupants
Access to physical space (across cities)
Access to dependant services Infrastructure Owners/operators
Building control (Stations/Airports)
Staff health and well-being Relevant (public) agencies
What?
Access to physical space
Access to dependant services
Building control
Building maintenance due to non-access
Stakeholder Management Senior Management (Int.) Senior Management (Int.) Senior Management (Int.)
(Internal / External) Legal Team (Int.) Legal Team (Int.) Legal Team (Int.)
Customers (Ext.) Estates Team (Int.) Estates Team (Int.)
ICO (Ext.) Staff (Int.) (in terms of health and well-being) BMS Supplier (Ext.)
BMS Supplier (Ext.) National Cyber Security Agency (Ext.)
Public (Ext.) (in terms of any PR/media engagement)
Anticipated Risks (in terms Technology/Cyber Technology/Cyber Technology/Cyber
of Cambridge Business Governance/Non-compliance Governance/Non-compliance/Negligence Technology/Critical Infrastructure
Risks (Family/Class)) /Negligence Governance/Non-compliance/Occupational Governance/Non-compliance/Negligence
Social/Brand Perception Health and Safety Governance/Litigation
(Number of Risk Families /Negative Customer Social/Human Capital/Labour Disputes & Strikes Social/Brand Perception/Negative Media Coverage
Exposed) Experience Social/Brand Perception/Negative Media Coverage Geopolitical/Interstate Conflict/Asymmetric Warfare
Financial/Counterparty/Supplier Failure Financial/Counterparty/Supplier Failure
Areas of uncertainty Financial liability (owed to Financial liability (owed to staff, and any other HQ Financial liability (owed to national claimants and
(by design) customers) building occupant) BMS supplier)
Further damage from the Further damage from the ransomware attack Further damage from the ransomware attack
ransomware attack
Further damage to the HQ building Further damage to the HQ building
Further damage across the nation
Involvement of an aggressive state actor
Technical areas of Malware (Ransomware) Malware (propagation from corporate network to Malware (propagation from BMS to backend cloud
complexity BMS) system)
Digital Building Digital Building
Management Systems Management Systems
(BMS) (Network Interface) (BMS) (PLCs + Remote Updating)
Digital forensic examination
Attack Classification 5 (Moderate incident) 3 (Significant incident) 1 (National cyber emergency)
appeared in the ranking differed. As might be expected,
where Technology was ranked by our participants, a 1st-place
ranking appeared more here than for any other category, and
relatively high up the list (no participants ranked it 5th or 6th).
No participants ranked Environmental risks in 1st place, but
interestingly at least two or more participants ranked every
other category as the most important risk to an organisation
before seeing our scenarios.
B. Scenario attack categorisation
As in Figure 2, participants noted a shift in the gen-
eral severity of the scenarios as the complexity and severity
increased (Table II). This was certainly the case from S2
(‘Medium’) to S3 (‘High’), if not S1 to S2. This indicates
that the design of increasing severity through ‘medium’ may
require attention to articulate an intermediate set of circum-
stances. The radar chart shows how the categorisation selection
was spread across participants – even in our limited cohort,
there was then some convergence but not absolute agreement
on how to categorise incidents.
C. Scenario risk categorisation
We saw that the diversity of indicated risk categories
increased as the scenarios became more complex, represented
simply as the average number of risk categories selected by
participants for each scenario (participants could select one or
more). For S1 the average is 2.68; S2, 2.84, and; S3, 3.63.
Looking at Figure 3, Financial risk was seen as the ‘top’
risk for S1, Technology for S2, and Geopolitical for S3. Within
expectations, S3 shows a greater divergence of categories
being selected than S2 and certainly in comparison to S1 (the
‘complexity’ of the risk landscape was seen by participants to
have broadened).
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Fig. 1. Top perceived cybersecurity risk categories, from the pre-workshop
survey (1 highest, 6 lowest). The x-axis indicates the total number of
participants who have included each category in their ranking.
No one risk category was completely ignored, though we
may regard Environmental (for S1) and Geopolitical (S2)
as having been categorised as non-critical risks. For each
scenario, there were categories which were ranked differently
by different participants (e.g., Financial in S1, Social and
Technology in S2, and Social and Technology in S3). That is,
a factor was seen as important, but opinions on how important
it was differed, in some cases across the entire ranking scale.
D. Responsibility mix
Participants were asked to indicate their perception of the
private-public mix of responsibility for risks seen in each
scenario (Figure 4), on a scale of 5 (Private sector) to 1 (Public
/ State). Values around the centre of the scale indicate shared
responsibility. Figure 4 shows a transition akin to a ‘wave’
when stepping through the scenarios, marginal from S1 to
S2, and pronounced from S2 to S3. Participant responses for
free-text questions support this, e.g., P7 (for S3), remarking
rhetorically that the state should “support the investigation”.
It is interesting to note that the range for each scenario is within
two steps on the scale – 5–3 for both S1 and S2, and 4–2 for
S3, with a slight shift of perceived responsibility toward the
State in S2 compared to S1. No participants perceived any one
scenario as being the sole responsibility of the State.
E. Reflections on uncertainty and technical complexity
The workshop included a dedicated debrief and discussion
section, where participants were able to raise any points or
clarifications about their thought process when responding to
each scenario. At the end of each round, participants were
asked to comment on uncertainty and technical complexity,
from which the quoted comments are derived. We report on
our findings along with some of the related areas addressed
in an open discussion that followed each scenario assessment.
1) Scenario 1: Participants observed that the scope and
impact of ransomware attacks need validation. Very often there
Fig. 2. Radar chart showing number of selections by participants of each
attack category (across the ‘spokes’ of the chart), against the six vertices of the
diagram. Each vertex represents one of the six defined ‘attack classification’
categories, category 6 for a localised or emergent incident, and category 1 for
a much more severe, national cyber emergency.
is a knee-jerk response to ransomware (in terms of discussions
on whether the ransom is paid, who is behind the attacks, and
so on). The implication here is organisations should consider
more carefully what existing procedures could be invoked (in
terms of backup and recovery options), and how to assess the
veracity of the claims being made by perpetrators. Essentially
then, ransomware depicts uncertainty in terms of the actual
danger it poses, and the need for validation. In response to
Q4 (about uncertainty), P8 captured the essence of this when
they commented “The full extent of the damage is not clear.
It is uncertain whether there was a breach of internal security
protocols and whether someone internal to the company is
responsible, intentionally or not”. Moore et al. [8] note that
senior security managers may have a sense that the nature of
uncertainty means not all risks can be actively mitigated.
While the scenario was designed to carry a certain level of
complexity, several participants expressed the need for more
detail to better assess the scenario, with P13 commenting
“More information is needed regarding the segmentation of
the networks and backups in order to draw any definitive
conclusions” in response to Q5 (about technical complexity).
2) Scenario 2: The nature of the customer-supplier rela-
tionship was a particular point of discussion for Scenario 2.
Regarding how much responsibility suppliers carry, this was
expressed both in terms of: (i) What support they offer to
investigate and recover from serious incidents, and; (ii) How
contractual terms with suppliers need to cover for liabilities
that customers carry.
In response to Q4 (uncertainty), participants explicitly chal-
lenged “Who is responsible for the resolution of the problem?”
(P1), and “What is most important to be established is where
the actual liability is - with the supplier or with Company A?”
(P8). Nearly a third of the participants raised questions around
the exact nature of responsibility carried by the supplier in
response to such an incident.
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Fig. 3. Business risk category rankings by no. of participants, for each of the
three scenarios (1 highest, 6 lowest). The x-axis indicates the total number of
participants who have included each category in their ranking.
The nature of escalation in Scenario 2 posed by the
introduction of the Building Management System (BMS) also
raised the level of perceived complexity, as noted by a quarter
of participants. In response to Q5 (complexity) comments
ranged from the exact nature of the connection between the
corporate network and the BMS, and the nature of potentially
unique vulnerabilities carried by systems such as the BMS.
3) Scenario 3: The participants highlighted the respon-
sibility split between state and private sectors, within the
context of a major incident. The role of national agencies,
and organisational responsibility to wider national stakeholders
was also questioned. This was set in the context of different
national policy frameworks and ecosystems. The participants’
shift to state taking responsibility for this incident is clear
from Figure 4; governance and social risks were seen as of
importance to a majority of the participants, but with varying
levels of priority associated with it.
The shift to the state for responsibility was summed up by
two of the participants, who made this explicit: “If there is a
national threat, shouldn’t the state support the investigation?”
Fig. 4. Tally of participant perception of the responsibility of the organisation
(‘private sector’) against that of the state in managing the risks in each scenario
(S1–S3). The y-axis indicates number of participants who have selected each
of the values 1 (‘State’) to 5 (‘Private Sector’).
(P7), and “In any such situation, there is a need and necessary
actions that the state must take with regard to the strategic
objects of national security.” (P14). Moore et al. [8] note that
some senior security managers in some organisations may also
be proactively briefed by the state about emerging threats.
The range of complexities posed by this scenario were
captured, where some of the key themes touched upon by the
participants include the “attribution to neighbouring states”,
sector-specific inter-dependencies, “cascading effects” from
cyber attacks, a need for greater communication between agen-
cies and private sector, and “technology support for [public
limited companies]”.
V. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
Here we reflect on both the design of the scenarios, and the
responses of participants to the scenarios, as emerged during
the exercise itself and the associated data collection.
A. Scenario design and perception of risks
In terms of methodology (RQ1), our use of attack cate-
gorisation [24] and risk categorisation [23] provides guidance
on the design of scenario escalation. These mechanisms allow
for the use of narrative hints on the nature of associated risk,
stakeholders involved, and non-technical complexities. Such
categorisation is also employed as a means of assessment.
This underlies a structure to the scenarios as a novel approach
to capturing responses, providing potential for benchmarking
across groups and sectors (as seen elsewhere in the develop-
ment of tabletop cybersecurity games [28]).
The participants in this study were briefed on the risk cat-
egories from the Cambridge Taxonomy of Business Risks [23]
before the scenario assessment to make explicit the scope of
risks for the study. As such, the taxonomy offers a particular
value for structured understanding of business risks, factoring
in societal, environmental and geopolitical risks as above
and beyond risks internal to the organisation. Future work
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would employ the taxonomy to probe the participants for
prior awareness and direct handling of various risks. This
would inform the confidence which can be placed in their
understanding and perception of risks in response to complex
organisational scenarios.
Another opportunity building on the use of the Cambridge
Taxonomy of Business Risks is to derive meaningful metrics
that factor in executive cybersecurity decision-making. This
could include whether certain risks such as social risks may
push up liability concerns, or geopolitical risks that may imply
state intervention of some form. Any such business concerns
could aid executives in identifying non–technical solutions,
such as cyber–insurance or outsourced mitigation, for example.
Executive decision-makers must be prepared to address
cyber risk perception, as is increasingly evident. The work
presented here investigates cyber risk perceptions at the highest
levels of organisations. In essence, there needs to be a means
to raise awareness and aid learning, so that these decision-
makers are prepared to take the appropriate decisions when
cybersecurity-related incidents occur.
Our focus on risk perception and ownership, rather than
risk mitigation, is an acknowledgement that at an executive
level decisions are primarily directed at strategy and resource
management. Most actual mitigation typically sits at a layer
below the executive, with responsibility for coordination, oper-
ations and procedural compliance within the organisation [29].
While acknowledging the complex nature of cyber risk,
our scenario design attempted to capture how an incident
may escalate across a number of dimensions, and as such
how associated risks rise (both in scope and severity). Our
findings show that risks were selected within our expectations,
and while the perceived private–public risk ownership and risk
categorisation broadly overlapped for the first two scenarios,
there was a notable shift in perceived risk to a higher level of
severity for the third scenario.
In reflection, the narrative in the first two scenarios has a
sharp focus on the organisation (that is, the fictional ‘Company
A’) including bearing the impact of the incidents, whereas the
third scenario escalates the impact to national infrastructure as
part of a “national cyber attack”. In sum, our methodology
highlights promise in further exploring risk perception from
a descriptive risk perspective [18], as opposed to normative
perspective (as relates to probabilities, etc.), especially when
engaging with risk-related skills and experience.
Regarding RQ2, repeating the study with other groups
would serve to validate the pattern of shifts in participants’
assessment of the scenarios as they escalate. Equally, this
raises the question of whether a “Medium” risk category has
sufficient meaning. That there is complexity in the scenario is
itself an element of the assessment of risks; the complexity
in our scenarios results also from changes across several
parameters which act as dimensions to the scenario (such as
affected stakeholders, and areas of uncertainty, as in Table II).
As noted earlier, the average number of risk categories selected
rose only from 2.68 (in S1) to 2.84 (in S2), in contrast with
3.63 (in S3). The jump in governance and social risks from
S1–S2 to S3 is also notable (Figure 3).
B. Future directions
Another lesson to draw here relates to the process of
scenario writing. Aside from any organisational dynamics and
technicalities of cyber attacks form the content, the perception
of risk may also be informed by the choice of terminology
for use in the research exercise [30], and nuances hiding in
the narrative. This is more of a challenge to tease out, as each
participant is informed by their own awareness and experience
(where we had acted to ‘baseline’ this in the pre-survey, to then
compare to the scenario-specific responses from participants).
There is then a challenge in maintaining ecological validity in
the scenarios, in such a way that scenarios resonate with all
participants – future applications of the approach will involve
consultation with knowledgeable (non-participant) experts to
assess scenario content for particular participant cohorts.
In terms of scenario content, aspects of organisational
behaviour, such as media attention or dependence on suppliers,
may be more tangible dimensions along which to escalate
scenarios. As such, these notions may allow for calibration
of participants’ skills and experience against expected identifi-
cation of risks, where accounting for the biases of the decision-
makers is key in objectively managing business risks [31].
Regarding how executives ‘deal with risk’ [18], the ac-
knowledgement of various risk types by security executives
paradoxically highlights that cyber-risk management in organ-
isations is not the sole responsibility of individual managers.
‘Distributed decision making’ by security analysts has been
observed elsewhere [21]; decisions at the executive level may
further involve two-way sharing of information so that the
objectives of security and top management are both met.
Cyber-risk management is also not an activity to be pursued
unilaterally by individual organisations (as indicated elsewhere
[8], where security features in perspectives on general business
risks [32]). It is a limitation that we engaged only with
cyber-risk managers, which will be addressed in future work
by involving a range of stakeholders in similar exercises –
cyber-related decisions are not only about ‘cyber’, requiring
coordination with others within and outside of the organisation.
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APPENDIX I – PARTICIPANT-FACING FORMS
Pre-exercise questions
1. What is your current role (job title)? [text box]
2. How many years of work experience do you have?
[0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10+]
3. In your current role, who do you report to (given their
role/job title)? [text box]
4. Can you give a brief summary of what IT-related
decision making do you carry out in your role? [text
box]
5. What do you perceive as top cybersecurity risks to
organisations? You may choose from any one or
more of the following risks: [Financial, Geopolitical,
Technology, Environmental, Social, and Governance].
If more than one, could you rank them in the order
of priority, with the highest risk at the top (1) down
to lower risk at the bottom (6). [Six rows, each with
risk labels as above].
Scenario questions (x3 – repeated for each scenario)
1. How would you categorise the current scenario in
terms of the following six attack categories? [Cy-
ber Attack categorisation with “category definition”
only].
2. Which of the following risks is the organisation in the
scenario exposed to in the current scenario? You may
choose from any one or more of the following listed
in the ‘Risks’ column below. [Financial, Geopolitical,
Technology, Environmental, Social, and Governance].
If more than one, please rank them in the order of
priority, with the highest risk at the top (1) down to
the lowest risk at the bottom (6). [Six rows, each with
risk labels as above].
3. For the purposes of risk mitigation, what is the split
of responsibility between the state and the private
sector (the organisation in the scenario)? Use the
scale below to assign this split between the state and
the private sector. Choose ’3’ if you consider the
responsibility to be equally shared between the state
and private sector. [5-point scale].
4. From the description of the scenario, what aspects are
most uncertain to you? [text box].
5. In terms of technical areas, what areas in the scenario
are the most complex to you? [text box].
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